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TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES

30-3-5. Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties and
children -- Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction -- Custody and
parent-time -- Determination of alimony -- Nonmeritorious petition for
modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is· rendered, the court may include in it equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
· (a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health
insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, ·and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary
and which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the
provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is
covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees,
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties'
separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services; and
(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an
acknowledgment by the court that the owner:
(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;
(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended
beneficiaries after the divorce becomes final; and
(iii) understands that ifno changes are made to the policy or contract, the
beneficiaries currently listed will receive any funds paid by the insurance company under
the terms of the policy or contract.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on
behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the
custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that
the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing
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the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to
the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by
modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement,
the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the Husband to pay the reasonable
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent~time order by a parent, or a
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a
visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise courtordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the
payorspouse;and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to
award alimony and the terms thereof.
(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that
substantially contributed to the breakup of the marriage relationship:
V
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(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse;
(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to
the other party or minor children;
(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to
reasonably fear life-threatening harm; or
(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability of the other party or the
minor children.
(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court
records.
(e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at
the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a).
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage.
(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining ~e
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through
the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(i) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds
that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
G) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years
that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court
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finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of
time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the
remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and
found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony
is made a party to the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined.
(IO) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating
with another person.

78B-12-203. Determination of gross income -- Imputed income.
(I) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from
any source, including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries,
wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages,
annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits,
unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and
payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned inco~e sources is limited to the equivalent of one fulltime 40-hour job. If and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the
parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court
may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child
support.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family
Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance,
Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and
( c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be
calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses
necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from
gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of
business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis
and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
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(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall
provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns
from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably
available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income
tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the
amount imputed, the parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the
judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding
enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown,
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week.
To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in
an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary
basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the
condition is not of a temporary nature:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job
skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's
presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such
as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent
shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned
income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) (i) a final order or decree resulting from:
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or
(B) a permit review adjudicative proceeding, as defined in Section 19-1-301.5; or
(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative
proceeding of an agency other than the following:
(A) the Public Service Commission;
(B) the State Tax Commission;
(C) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources;
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(F) the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
-(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who
are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
G) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
IX

®

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G,
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings .
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code §78A-4-103.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the lower court abused its discretion by miscalculating the value,

equity, and distribution of the marital home causing the Husband to lose tens of
thousands of dollars of equity?
Issue 2: Whether the lower court abused its discretion by failing to order an appraisal of
~

the marital home when the estimated value of the marital home was disputed by over
$140,000?
Issue 3: Whether the lower court abused its discretion by failing to impute a higher

income to the Wife where she has a history of working in excess of 40 hours per week,
but during the litigation of the divorce only worked two to three days per week?
Issue 4: Whether the lower court abused its discretion in dividing the personal property

of the parties by ignoring the correct trial testimony in calculating the value of the
property awarded to each party?
Issue 5: Whether the lower court abused its discretion in determining the Husband's

ability to pay alimony, and the Wife's need for alimony, where it failed to consider
certain and material expenses such as the Husband's health insurance costs and costs to
care for the dog that was awarded to him?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court of Appeals reviews an appeal from a district court's decisions in a final
decree of divorce relating to ... alimony and property division for an abuse of discretion. 1
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN TRIAL COURT

"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. " 2
Husbands have preserved each of the below presented issues for appeal through argument
and testimony on each issue at the two-day trial held on January 28, 2014 and February
19, 2014, R. 2882 and 2883. In addition, on post-trial motions the lower court declined to
correct the errors appealed. Further citations to the record will be more fully established
throughout for each individual issue raised.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from a highly contested divorce where there has been significant
dispute over the Decree of Divorce that was entered following a two-day trial. Following
the entry of the first Decree of Divorce, two Rule 59 motions and a Rule 60 motion were
filed due in large part to the same accounting and judgment errors to be appealed herein.
After lengthy dispute and argument, the trial court decided not to set a new trial or set
aside the judgment but did enter new Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law along
with the 2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce which was entered on December 12, 2014.
Tobler v. Tobler, 337 P.3d 296,299 (Utah App. 2014)
2 Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 221 P.3d 256, 2645 (Utah 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)
1

2

However, the 2nd Amended Decree of Divorce failed to address or correct many of the
~

clear errors that in the trial court's Findings after trial were disputed following the first
Decree of Divorce. This appeal became necessary to fairly distribute the marital assets
and correct the discretionary abuses made by the trial court.
RELEVANT FACTS

The following facts are relevant to the issues appealed:
1. The parties were married on June 10, 1989. R. 51.
2. The parties last separated on January 15, 2013. R. 2749.
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3. The Husband filed for divorce on October 31, 2011. R. 51.
4. A two-day trial was held on January 28, 2014 and February 19, 2014. R. 28822883.
5. At trial, the Husband testified that the marital home's original mortgage amount
was $167,000 but that the remaining balance due and owing was only $70,000. R.

·ViJ

2882; p. 124: 18-21; p. 210:8-13. There was no trial testimony regarding the initial
value of the property.
6. The Husband also testified about improvements and additions that had been made
to the marital home to increase its value from its original state.Rat 2882-2883;
Day 1, p. 112: 10-23 and Day 2, p. 56:1-13.
7. The Husband presented evidence of materially similar comparable homes to the
marital home showing that the market rate was significantly more than the tax
assessed value of the home. See Trial Exhibit #28.

3

8. The Husband testified, and it was not disputed, that the Wife historically worked
at least two jobs during the marriage. R. 2882: p. 41:2-13.
9. The Wife testified at trial that she only worked one job 2-3 days per week and has
several days off each week at the time of trial. R. 2883: p. 3-18
10. The Wife testified of estimated values of several items of personal property that
were later awarded to her as part of the division of marital assets. R. 2882: p. 225259.
11. The Husband testified, and it was not disputed, that he purchased his 1967
Chevelle from his uncle before he was married to the Wife. R. 2882: p. 62: 1-8.
12. The Husband provided on his financial declaration, which was introduced at trial
as Exhibit #32, that after the divorce he estimated that his health insurance costs
would be $300 per month. 3 See "Trial Exhibit #32."
13. In the Wife's estimated budget contained in her financial declaration, she claimed
expenses for care of the parties' dog. 4 See "Trial Exhibit #35."
14. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court took the matter under advisement.
15.Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on April 25, 2014. R. 1723.
16. The trial court awarded the marital home to the Wife and ordered the equity be
divided. In calculating the equity in the home, the trial court erroneously used the
original amount of the mortgage as the balance owing instead of the then-current

See "Trial Exhibit #32: "Husband's Amended Financial Declaration," p. 10
4 See "Trial Exhibit #35: Wife's Financial Declaration."

3
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balance owing at the time. R. 1723; See "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law," p. 17.
17. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court judge asserted
that the Wife's income was undisputed even though there was evidence presented
that she is only working one job where she historically worked two. R. 1723; See
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," p. 12.
18. The district court judge awarded substantial amounts of personal property to the
Wife and largely determined the value of the property by averaging the estimated
values of the items together. R. 1723; See "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law," p. 28-29.
19.However, the trial court also derived many values that have no basis in evidence.
20. The trial court awarded Wife alimony, but in its analysis of Husband's available
income and ability to pay, did not include his expenses to care for the dog he was
awarded or for the $300 per month he would be paying for health insurance
following the entry of the Decree of Divorce. R. 1723; See "Findings of Pact and
Conclusions of Law," p. 12-15.
21.Husband filed a Rule 59 and 60(a) motion and memorandum on June 5, 2014,
contesting many of the findings and orders issued by the district court and
requesting a new trial, or in the alternative, requesting to open the evidence and
amend the court's findings. R. 1985.

5

22.A 2nd Amended Decree of Divorce was entered December 12, 2014, which
materially failed to adequately address and resolve many of the blatant errors,
mathematical and otherwise, found in the first Decree of Divorce. R. 2749.
23.A notice of appeal was filed on January 12, 2015. R. 2758.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The trial court made clear mathematical errors in its calculation dividing the
estimated equity in the marital home and wrongly used the original cost of the
mortgage instead of the then current balance owing on the mortgage to subtract
from the estimated market value to determine the equity in the marital home.
2. The trial court erred by failing to impute the Wife's income consistent with her
historical earning capacity and job history because during the divorce she only
worked at one job 2-3 days per week for less than 36 hours whereas, while
married, she traditionally worked two jobs for more than 40 hours per week.
3. The trial court erred in dividing several items of personal property by misapplying
trial testimony and determining values that have no basis in evidence.
4. The trial court failed to include material expenses in the Husband's monthly
budget that led to it appearing he had more income available to pay alimony than
he really does. This error led to a miscalculation of the alimony he was ordered to
pay to the Wife.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT MISAPPLIED TRIAL TESTIMONY THAT LED TO A
SEVERE MISCALCULATION OF THE EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOJ\.ffi,
CAUSING THE HUSBAND TO LOSE OUT ON TENS OF THOUSANDS OF
6

DOLLARS OF MARITAL PROPERTY. FURTHER, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE ORDERED AN APPRAISAL TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE ITS VALUE
BEFORE DISTRIBUTING THE EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME.
A. Calculation of Equity in the Marital Home

The trial court erroneously calculated the equity in the home which led to the Wife
being unduly awarded substantially more value of the marital home than appropriate
given the testimony of the parties. "Marital property is typically awarded so that each
spouse receives a roughly equal share."5
The 2nd Amended Decree of Divorce states the following:
"Wife believes the home to be valued at $285,400. This is consistent with the
current (2013) tax value as submitted in Exhibit #28. Husband's testimony is
that the parties currently owe $167,000. This leaves the parties with equity of
$188,400."6
However, running through the calculation used by the trial court does not yield the
same result. $285,400 - $167,000 = $118,400. Ostensibly, the trial court's use of
$188,400 was a simple typographical error but nonetheless, the number of$188,400
divided by 2 was used as a starting point by the trial court to calculate each party's share
of the marital home. 7
Notwithstanding this error, the figures used by the trial court to calculate equity
were not definitively established. The trial court stated that the wife believes the house to
be valued at $285,400. 8 Yet, there is no testimony at trial from the wife that supported
this conclusion. The wife did provide two financial declarations, one of which estimated
Thompson v. Thompson, 2009 UT App 101,18, 208 P.3d 539
Record at 2749; See "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 17
7 Id.
8 Id.
5

·,d

6
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the value of $269,600 and the other at $285,400. 9 There was no trial testimony from the
Wife confirming her exact belief as to the value of the home. Because of the disparity in
estimated values by the Wife alone, the trial court's reliance on this number was
unreasonable and was an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, the trial court misstates the Husband's testimony pertaining to the
remaining balance due on the mortgage. The trial court stated that "Husband's testimony
is thatthe parties currently owe $167,000." 10 But that is not in evidence. In his financial
declaration, Husband stated that the original amount of the mortgage loan was $167,000,
but that the remaining balance at the time of the trial was estimated to be only $70,000
with an estimated value of $425,000, which was supported by comparable sales in the
neighborhood. 11 And several occasions in the trial, the Husband testified that the
remaining mortgage was close to $70,000. 12
Even if the trial court chooses to use the Wife's estimated value of $285,400 for
the house (which Husband disputes as inaccurate and not reflecting years of
improvements), it should have used the accurate amount on the remaining mortgage
which was estimated to be close to $70,000. This would have yielded equity in the
G

amount of $215,400, not the $188,400 that the trial court found. The trial court's failure
to apply the actual amount owing on the mortgage constitutes a gross error and an abuse
of discretion that dramatically impacted the eventual financial award to the Husband by
9 See

"Trial Exhibit #35: Wife's Financial Declaration"
10 Record at 2749; See "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 17
11 See "Trial Exhibit #32: "Husband's Amended Financial Declaration," p. 5; See also
Record 2882; p. 124:18-19
12 Record at 2882; p. 124: 18-21; p. 210:8-13
8

more than $15,000. This Court should remand on this issue to allow the trial court to
¼J

correct its mathematical errors.

B. Estimated Value of the Marital Home
Husband disputes the trial court's use of the inaccurate tax assessed estimated
value because it appears to be based on outdated facts and information. There is no
indication in the trial record that the 2013 tax assessed value includes the updates and
improvements that the Husband testifies had been made after its original purchase. Both
parties testified that significant improvements have been made to the home and that it is
~

now an all brick home with 5 bedrooms, 3 .5 baths, a 6 car garage with the addition of a
separate 1200 square foot, 6 car brick detached garage. 13 The Husband also testified that
the basement is now completely finished. 14 Without a finding that the tax appraisal relied
upon includes such post-construction improvements, it is gross error to use the tax value
or any public document containing outdated and inaccurate information as the value of

_;;

the marital home. The trial court abused its discretion when it did so.
Husband also provided and introduced into evidence at trial two comparable
market values for nearby homes showing that neighboring homes substantially similar to
the marital home sold for $385,000 - far more than the 2013 tax assessed value for the
marital home. 15 And based on his knowledge of the work and improvements that he made
to his home over the prior years, the Husband testified at trial that the home should be

Record at 2882-2883; Day 1, p. 112: 10-23 and Day 2, p. 56:1-13
Record at 2882; Day 1, p. 185: 21-23
15 See "Trial Exhibit #28"
13

14
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valued at $425,000. 16 On the contrary, the only support that the Wife provided for her
conclusion that the marital home was worth $285,400 was an outdated 2013 tax
assessment (sans detail regarding features) relying on old data from the time of purchase
that was no longer accurate.
Due to the vast disparity between the estimated values argued by each party, at the
very least the trial court should have ordered an appraisal on the home before calculating
and distributing the unknown equity in the home. There was substantial and significant
discussion, testimony, and argument at the trial pertaining to the marital home and its
estimated value that directly brought into question the accuracy of the tax assessed
value. 17 It would have been more accurate for the trial court to order an appraisal, or
simply order the house be sold as requested by the Husband, which would effectively
address the same concern - an accurate assessment of the equity in the home. In
explaining its methodology for dividing the personal property, the trial court stated:
"Where the values have been particularly disparate, and where the item has substantial
value, the court has determined that the item should simply be sold." 18 If the trial court
reasoned that it was prudent to simply average several items of personal property for
which the value was contested, such as the Husband's 1967 Chevelle (addressed below),
why would it not do the same for a house worth hundreds of thousands of dollars? The
difference between the estimate of the values of the house between the two parties is
$140,000. Surely even the trial court's own methodology applied uniformly would have
Record 2882; p. 124: 22-24
Record at 2882: p. 9: 16-23; p. 112: 10-23; p. 184-186; Record at 2883: p. 56: 1-13
18 Record at 1723; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2
16
17
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yielded a much more equitable result than arbitrarily adopting an inaccurate tax value and
liJ

subtracting the original mortgage from the same.
Instead of ordering an appraisal as it did with a car, 19 or averaging the estimates of
the parties as it largely did in dividing personal property, 20 the trial court simply took at
face value an unproven value from the Wife, despite this issue being rife with
controversy. The trial court's failure to at least order an appraisal is a clear abuse of
discretion given the facts and circumstances presented. This·Court should remand to the
trial court, with a directive for the trial court to order an appraisal and then, only after it
has an accurate understanding of the true value of the home should it divide the equity in
the marital home.
II.
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DIVIDED THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY LED TO AN UNBALANCED APPROPRIATION OF THE MARITAL
AND NON-MARJTAL PROPERTY TO THE WIFE THAT nJSTIFIES REMAND

A. Personal Property Awarded to Wife
The trial court's distribution of the personal property was inconsistent with its own
methodology. In most all circumstances, the trial court determined the value of each item
by simply averaging the estimated values of each party. 21 In some areas, the trial court
ignored its own methodology and simply chose one party's value over the other without
providing any factual finding as to why it did so. However, this method led to the
miscalculation of the values and subsequent illogical division of personal property.

Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 23
20 Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
21 Record at 1723; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2
19
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The trial court awarded to the Wife ''wife's jewelry" which the husband valued at
$10,000 and which the trial court claims the wife valued at $700. 22 The trial court then
valued "wife's jewelry" at $1,000 in its distribution. 23 However, even the Wife herself
testified to a much higher valuation at trial. She testified that the jewelry was worth
$6,000, then subtracted $2,000 for her pre-marital portion of that jewelry, leaving an
estimated value of$4,000. 24 Instead of splitting the difference per its own methodology,
the trial court took the Wife's pre-trial value of $700 (instead of the trial testimony value
she asserted ~as $4,000) and awarded Wife $1000 for the jewelry. 25 At the very least,
even if the trial court was not splitting the difference as it determined, using the Wife's
estimated value of $4000, the outcome would have been more equitable. However,
pursuant to its predominantly used methodology, the trial court should have averaged the
two values ($10,000+$4,000 = $14,000 /2 = $7,000) and award the Wife $7,000 in
marital money for the jewelry that the Husband had purchased for her. This would have
increased her marital portion by $6,000 and subsequently reduced the amount the
Husband would have to compensate her out of his share of the equity in the marital home.
This error is illustrated below, along with similar mistakes that were made on
several other items of personal property:

Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
23 Id.
24 Record at 2882: p. 230:21-25 - 231: 1-3
25 Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
22
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Property
Awarded to
Wife

Husband's
Value
Claimed by
the Court

Wife's Value
Erroneously
Claimed by
Court

Actual Value
Wife
Estimated at
Trial

Value Used
by Court
when
distributing
the Asset

Value
Court
Should
have used
Applying
Court
Testimonv

Amount
Wife
Wrongfully
Received

Dining
Room
Table and
Chairs
Kitchen
Aid and
Crock
Pots
Hutch
Ipod
Touch
Wife's

900 26

20027

300 28

550 29

600

+$50

50030

10031

200 32

100 33

200

+$250

800 34
200 38

200 35
039

300 36
2540

500 37
100 41

550
$112.50

+$50
+$112.50

10 00042

70043

4000 44

1000 45

$7000

+$6000

'

26 Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
11 Id.
28 Record at 2882: p. 226:7
29 Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Record at 2882: p. 228: 14-17
33 Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Record at 2882: p. 226:10-15
37 Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Record at 2882: p. 230: 13-17
41 Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Record at 2882: p. 230:21-25, 231:1-3
45 Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
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Jewelry
Cement
Pots and
Fountains

450 46

Q47

25048

25049

$2500

TOTAL

$350

+$100

$8812.50 +$6562.50

When you add the actual testified values, the Wife received a windfall of at least
$6,562.50, in turn depriving the Husband the same amount. The trial court's failure to
accurately apply the testimony of the parties in dividing the marital assets constitutes an
abuse of discretion justifying relief in favor of the Husband. This Court should remand on
this issue to allow the trial court to follow its own methodology to correct its errors
regarding the division of and accounting for personal property.

B. Personal Property Awarded to Husband
The trial court erred in its distribution of personal property by failing to consider
the pre-marital portion of the 1967 Chevelle before ordering its appraisal and sale. It was
undisputed at trial that the Husband purchased the Chevelle from his uncle before he was
married to the Wife, thus making the car's value at the time of marriage his pre-marital
property. 50 Husband acknowledges that the trial court determined that the Chevelle
obtained a status of marital property because of all of the repairs and improvements done .
on the car during the marriage. However, those repairs and improvements do not deprive
the Chevelle of its pre-marital value before the improvements were made. Thus, the

Id.
47 Id.
46

Record at 2882: p. 231: 23-25, 232: 1-2
Record at 2749, "2nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 29
50 Record at 2882: p. 62:1-8

48

49
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repairs and the corresponding increased value should be separated out from the preQ

marital portion of the vehicle. Instead, the trial court simply ordered the Chevelle to be
sold with proceeds divided equally after an appraisal was to be completed. 51 The
Chevelle had a clear pre-marital value before all of the repairs were completed. That premarital value held by the Husband should be determined by appraisal and excluded from
the division of the proceeds of the sale once the car is sold.
III.
THE LOWER COURT MADE MANY ERRORS IN CALCULATING THE
WIFE'S NEED FORAND THE HUSBAND'S ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY THAT
HA VE A LONG-TERM PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ON THE HUSBAND.
In addition to failing to impute a higher and more accurate income to the Wife
(addressed below), the trial court also made material errors in its analysis of the parties'
need and ability to pay alimony. Among others factors involved in an alimony analysis,
the district court must consider the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse
and the expenses and ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 52
For example, the court failed to account for the $300 per month health insurance
costs the Husband began to incur once the divorce was over. During the marriage, the
Husband was covered under the Wife's health insurance plan with Intermountain
Healthcare. Anticipating his need for health insurance following the divorce, he added
$300 to his financial declaration for health insurance contingent upon the completion of

Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 23
52 Utah Code 30-3-5(8)(a)
51
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the divorce. 53 But the trial court did not include this expense in its analysis although it
was clearly stated on his financial declaration. 54
Additionally, in reviewing the Wife's budget, the trial court noted that she set
aside $160 for haircuts and dog care. Part of that expense no longer became necessary
because the dog was awarded to the Husband. Consequently, the trial court reduced that
expense from $160 to $60 but failed to add the corresponding $100 in dog care expenses
to the Husband's budget. This further affects the Husband's budget and ability to pay
alimony in a material way justifying relief.
Finally, the trial court's own order is inconsistent and inaccurate. Where the trial
court explains its order for alimony in the 2nd Amended Decree of Divorce, it uses three
completely different numbers. At one point, the trial court states "Therefore, 11r. Osborne
shall pay $706 in alimony per month."55 However, just one paragraph later, the trial court
states "Husband will continue to pay alimony of $764 per month until the child turns
18." 56 There is no explanation for why $764 was used when just sentences before it
concluded Mr. Osborne should pay only $706. Another paragraph later, after discussing
the Wife's need for increased alimony once she stops receiving child support, the trial
court increases her alimony award to $874 without explaining with a valid reference to
the evidence, the basis for that number. The trial court also failed entirely to provide any

See "Trial Exhibit #32: "Husband's Amended Financial Declaration," p. 10
Id.
55 Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 16
56 Id.
53

54
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rational basis for increasing alimony after a dependent child is no longer being supported
~

by her.
Had the court properly assigned both the Husband's health insurance costs and the
dog care costs after the divorce, it would have found that the Husband had $400 less
available to him to pay alimony than it did. That amounts to $4,800 per year, nearly 20%
of the Husband's gross income. Combined with the disparity in the various alimony
awards, the·trial court's complete alimony analysis constitutes a clear abuse of discretion
justifying remand.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE WIFE'S HISTORICAL
INCO1\1E BEFORE Th1PUTING INCO1\1E TO HER EVEN THOUGH THE WIFE
IBSTIFIED THAT DURING THE MARRIAGE SHE TRADITIONALLY WORKED
TWO-TO-THREE JOBS AND WELL OVER 40 HOURS PER WEEK.

A. Failure to Impute Income
The trial court abused its discretion by taking at face value the Wife's asserted
income without considering her historical earnings. Where there is a significant
difference between income at the time of the divorce and recent historical income, it is
appropriate for the trial court to rely upon historical earning potential.57 Further, it is
insufficient for a trial court to merely reference [a party's] income without adequately
considering his or her earning capacity. 58
Despite Utah law being clear on the subject, the trial court failed to follow the
directive to consider the Wife's earning capacity. The Decree of Divorce simply stated
"Wife's testimony of her income is undisputed and the Court finds her gross monthly
..,r)

51

58

Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah. Ct. App. 1994)
See generally Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ,r 9,974 P.2d 306
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income to be $2,485." 59 It is simply inaccurate for the trial court to state the wife's
testimony of her income is undisputed because on cross-examination at trial, the Wife
revealed that she has several days off each week and thus has the capability of working
more than one job.60 There was additional trial testimony that revealed that the Wife
historically held at least two jobs during the marriage. 61 But once the process of litigating
the divorce began, she voluntarily became underemployed by dropping down to only one
job picking up 2-3 shifts per week at Intermountain Healthcare. 62 She also testified that
she "always has a few days off' each week. 63 Typically, her shifts at Intermountain
Healthcare were 12-hour shifts so on weeks where she would work three shifts, that was
only 36 hours per week at $15.93 per hour. Due to this flexible schedule, the Wife
worked an additional job during the marriage on her "few days off' per week. 64 The
Wife's justification for this reduction in work was that she needed to be home to watch
her 16 year old son. 65 This is a dubious claim because the child is still at school for much
of the day which would give her plenty of time to work, and he is of a sufficient age to
care for himself for a couple of hours each of the few days per week she works.
When considering the Wife's earning capacity, the trial court should have at the
very least imputed her income to $15.93 x 40 hours, which would give her an additional
$254.88 per month in income that should have been considered before determining her
Record at 2749, "2 nd Amended Decree of Divorce," p. 12
60 Record at 2883: p. 33:3-18
61 Record at 2882: p. 41 :2-13
62 Record at 2883: p. 33:3-18
63 Record at 2883: p. 33:13
64 Record at 2882: p. 40: 19-20
65 Record at 2883: p. 33:19-25

59
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need for alimony. Instead, the trial court abused its discretion by merely referencing her
income on her financial declaration, ignoring trial testimony regarding her work
experience, and failing to consider her historical work history during the marriage that
was significantly greater than at the time of trial.
Furthermore, had the trial court properly imputed the Wife's income to its
historical amount, it would have increased her own ability to provide for her needs by at
least $254. per month which in turn would reduce her.need by an equal amount. When
adding the errors regarding the dog care and Husband's health care expenses, that
amounts to $654 in alimony that the Husband was wrongfully ordered to pay each month.
Multiplied over the length of the marriage, which was 295 months, that equals an
overpayment of$192,930 that the Wife really should not receive in alimony from the
Husband. These abuses of discretion materially affected the alimony calculation, and the
calculation of child support the Husband was ordered to pay. This Court should remand
..J

so the trial court can correct its error regarding the Wife's income.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, relief is justified to correct the gross
mathematical errors and abuses of discretion by the trial court. It is without question that
the trial court erroneously used the wrong numbers to calculate the equity in the marital
home. It also relied on outdated, unsupported, and disputed data to determine the current
estimated value of the marital home when it should have determined the actual value via
appraisal.
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The trial court made further errors in its division of personal property by ignoring
and misapplying trial testimony and making additional mathematical errors that had no
evidentiary basis. The trial court also erred in its needs analysis in determining alimony
by failing to impute the proper income to the Wife, and completely ignored obvious and
stated expenses by the Husband.
These errors alone lead to the Husband's loss of tens of thousands of dollars in
marital assets and potentially result in a windfall of hundreds of thousands of dollars in
favor of the Wife. In the interests of fairness and equity, the Husband respectfully
requests that this Court remand this case to the lower court with an order to have the
marital home appraised and for a proper and fair adjudication of the property division,
income and support issues as set forth herein.

DATED AND SIGNED this 7th day of April, 2015.
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